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self-restraint in the determination of standing questions.80
A transaction-investor standard of standing determines standing
not on the merits of the plaintiff's case, but on the neutral principles
discernible from the position of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the investment de-
cision-making process."' At the same time, the standard tends to elim-
inate plaintiffs with unprovable claims.82 The transaction concept pro-
vides an element of flexibility, 3 and the decision-making approach pro-
vides some certainty. Finally, the lessons of the Birnbaum experience
are not ignored.
C. CLINTON STRETCH
Tax-Only God Knows For Sure But the I.R.S. Makes a Good
Guess-Use of the Treasury Department's Actuarial Tables
An individual's life expectancy determines, in many tax situations,
the number of tax dollars the federal government will receive. Conse-
quently, the method used to measure this expectancy is extremely im-
portant to both the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayer. How-
ever, the courts disagree' on whether this valuation should be based
upon actual expectancy or actuarial expectancy.'
agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute
no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Id. at 12.
80. See notes 55 & 78 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 4 supra.
82. This was the concern of the court in Manor Drug; see note 21 supra.
83. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
1. Compare Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1971), with Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 32 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 6235 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
2. "Actual expectancy" involves consideration of all facts pertinent to an indi-
vidual's state of health. "Actuarial expectancy" is determined by extensive averaging
of the population as a whole and does not consider the state of health of the specific
individual in question.
The statutory foundation for the actuarial tables is INT. REV. CODE Op 1954,
§ 7805(a), which authorizes the issuance of "all needful rules and regulations" for the
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. These tables are used by the Internal Rev-
enue Service for a variety of tax purposes in valuing annuities, life estates, remainders
and reversions. Some of these purposes are: (a) Valuation of general life estates with
remainer interests to others; (b) Valuation of life annuities [But see ABA, Memoran-
dum of Feb. 11, 1974 (Proposal C) concerning changes in section 72(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code]; (c) Valuation of income interests in funds for terms for years; (d) Val-
uation of annuity interests for terms for years; (e) Valuation in corporation-stockholder
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In Merchants National Bank v. United States3 a federal district
court recently held that actuarial tables could not be used conclusively
in valuing a life estate for purposes of the estate tax credit under sec-
tion 2013 of the estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.4 The case involved an action for a partial refund of estate taxes
paid by plaintiff, the executor of decedent's estate. Plaintiff had
earlier failed to take a section 2013 credit for the tax paid on prior
transfers to the decedent by the estate of her brother, who died eight
months prior to decedent. The plaintiff argued that the value of de-
cedent's life interest for purposes of the credit should be determined
solely from the applicable actuarial tables.5 However, Merchants Na-
tional reversed its earlier memorandum decision6 and held that "ac-
tuarial tables are not the exclusive factor to be used in valuing life es-
tates, but that other factors tending to show a shorter or longer life ex-
pectancy, if they have probative value, may be considered also.'"' The
decision thus reduces the tables to mere evidentiary status. Although
the court believed that the exclusive use of the actuarial tables was the
better practice, it stated that "the weight of authority is definitely to the
contrary."" "The court's acquiescence in outside authority is unfor-
tunate, for there are strong arguments supporting its belief that the ac-
tuarial tables should be used exclusively.
Merchants National relied on Miami Beach First National Bank v.
United States,9 Estate of Lion v. Commissioner0 and Revenue Ruling
66-307." Miami involved the valuation of a charitable remainder in-
terest via determination of the life expectancy of decedent's widow who
annuity agreements; (f) Valuation in income tax charitable contribution deductions, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170, estate tax charitable deductions, id. § 2055(e) (2) (A), and
gift tax charitable deductions (id. § 2522(c) (2) (A)) for remainder interests placed in
trust.
3. P-H 1973 FED. TAxEs, EsT. & GFT (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 1 147,870
(D. Kan. June 26, 1973).
4. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2013 provides:
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The tax imposed by section 2001 shall be credited with
all or part of the amount of the Federal estate tax paid with respect to the
transfer of property (including property passing as a result of the exercise or
non-exercise of a power of appointment) to the decedent by or from a person
(herein designated as a "transferor") who died within 10 years before, or
within 2 years after, the decedent's death....
5. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), table I (1958).
6. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1446 (D. Kan.
1973).
7. P-H 1973 FED. TA ES, ET. & GIFT at 149, 336.
8. Id.
9. 443 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429,
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was afflicted with a number of serious medical conditions at the time
of her husband's death. The court spoke of the "presumptive cor-
rectness" of the actuarial tables, but concluded that sufficient evidence
regarding the actual life expectancy could overcome this presumption. 2
However, the court held that in this case the actuarial tables should be
used exclusively, because testimony concerning the widow's actual life
expectancy was highly speculative and therefore insufficient to overcome
the presumption.
In setting forth its general test of "presumptive correctness", the
court noted that the Treasury Regulations also anticipate this approach
in section 20.2031-1 (b), which provides in part that "[a]ll relevant facts
and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date shall be con-
sidered in every case."' 3  This argument seems very tenuous, however,
since this regulation is merely the general valuation section for gross
estates. Section 20.2031-7, on the other hand, specifically concerns
valuation of life expectancy, and such calculations are based on the
tables set forth in this latter section. Arguably, this section takes pre-
cedence over the more general section on valuation of gross estates.' 4
In Estate of Lion, the other case relied on by Merchants National,
the issue was whether an estate tax credit' 5 should be allowed for prop-
erty previously subjected to estate tax. The credit was claimed for
a life estate in a residuary trust created by decedent's husband with
whom she died in a common accident. The court did not allow the
credit, holding that the value of Mrs. Lion's life estate at the time of
the transfer was zero and that the actuarial tables would not be applied
"where there is reasonable certainty that use of the tables would violate
reason and fact."'" The court concluded that it would be unreasonable
to value Mrs. Lion's life interest by use of the tables' 7 since a hypothet-
12. 443 F.2d at 119.
13. Id. at 119-20, quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1.
14. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1446, 1447 (D.
Kan. 1973).
15. IrT. REv. CODEOF 1954, § 2013.
16. 438 F.2d at 61; see Estate of Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384 (1957); Estate of Butler,
18 T.C. 914 (1952); Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949); Estate of Nellie H.
Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948).
17. The court also used language in the regulations to sustain its decision that strict
use of the tables is not required:
That the tables may or may not reflect "recognized valuation principles" is im- -
plicit in the use of the phrase "see especially § 2031-7" . . rather than an
imperative phrase, for example, "as determined by § 20.2031-7," or an ex-
pression of like import. The regulations thus leave room for departure from
strict application of the tables.
438 F.2d at 60.
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ical buyer would have paid nothing for her "interest" at the time of
the transfer."' Estate of Lion therefore provides strong precedent for
selective use of the regulation tables."
Finally, Revenue Ruling 66-307 states that outside evidence will
be allowed for valuing life and remainder interests for purposes of
computing the allowable credit for tax on prior transfers, when the
death of a life tenant from. known causes is predictable and imminent
on the valuation date.20  Although the court in Merchants National,
an opinion written by Judge Templar, upheld this ruling, it had been
invalidated a few days earlier by a district court in Continental Bank
& Trust v. United States21 as being in direct conflict with the regula-
tions. Continental demanded strict use of the tables even though the
decedent-life tenant was seventy-five years old and suffering from in-
curable cancer and even though medical testimony estimated her life
expectancy to be less than six months at the time of the transfer.2
Ironically, Continental cited the earlier memorandum decision of Mer-
chants National as authority for requiring exclusive use of the Treasury
tables.23 Evidently, Judge Templar was not aware that his earlier
memorandum decision had gained support when he reversed himself
and withdrew the earlier opinion.24
There are substantial arguments supporting Judge Templar's earlier
memorandum decision. For example, the justification often given for
favoring actual expectancy over actuarial expectancy is the unreli-
ability of actuarial tables as valuation devices per se, without regard
to policy considerations. Generally, these doubts have been rejected
18. Id. at 62. Although it may seem unreasonable to use the actuarial tables in
"simultaneous death" cases, the court's hypothetical buyer test is an equally imperfect
method of valuation, which is deficient when applied in other situations. A hypothetical
buyer would pay little or nothing for the life estate of a person with an incurable disease.
Nevertheless, the person could possibly live for a long time and the value to him might
therefore be much greater than the market value.
19. "Where at the time of the transferor's death it was unmistakable to one in pos-
session of the facts that the transferee's life would be radically shorter than predicted
in the actuarial tables, the value of a transferred life estate may be reduced accordingly
for purposes of calculating the tax credit under § 2013." Id.
20. The ruling refers to the principle of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948)
and also cites Estate of Nicholas Murray Butler, 18 T.C. 914 (1952), acquiesced in,
1953-1 CuM. BuLL. 3; Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949), acquiesced in in
part, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 3; Estate of John Halliday Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946),
acquiesced in, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
21. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6235 (N.D. Il. 1973).
22. Continental involved the tax credit under section 2013.
23. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 6236.
24. The cases were decided fourteen days apart. In light of Continental, Judge
Templar could conceivably return to his earlier decision when the opportunity arises.
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by the courts 5 except in cases in which there are unusual circum-
stances.2 Arguably, the tables should be applied conclusively under all
circumstances. As evaluation devices the actuarial tables are "broadly
equitable12 7 tools for both the taxpayer and the Service. Courts have
said that "the United States is in business with enough different tax-
payers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to work."2
Consequently, in the long run all parties benefit from strict use of the
tables; unreasonable results from the government's point of view even
out, and extremely harsh results for the taxpayer 29 have been softened
by new Code sections.3 0
Valuation of life expectancy under any method is at best impre-
cise; thus, a method that is systematically applied has a quality of cer-
tainty that is advantageous for many reasons, administrative conven-
ience being one of the most important. As Justice Holmes stated in
a Supreme Court case dealing with actuarial tables: "[Value] as the
word is used by the law .. . depends largely on more or less certain
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if
later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true. '3 1  The
tables provided by regulations necessarily deal with probabilities, but
they apply indiscriminately to all individuals and incorporate in their
statistics the possibility of premature death as well as longevity.32
Systematic application of the tables for valuation will consequently save
much time, preclude spurious arguments by both the Service and the
taxpayer,3  and relieve the courts of the burden of calculating im-
ponderables. Moreover, the courts have emphasized the desirability of
using the tables in uncertain and speculative situations in order to avoid
unnecessary complexity and confusion. 4
25. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 7.07, at 416
(1959).
26. See Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 429.
27. Estate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 732 (1954).
28. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1968); Gelb v. Commis-
sioner, 298 F.2d 544, 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
29. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
30. E.g., INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2013 (tax credit for prior transfers).
31. 279 U.S. at 155.
32. See Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116, 120 (5th
Cir. 1971).
33. See Palfrey v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 153 (D. Mass. 1940) in which the
taxpayer argued that "the beneficiaries of this life estate were of such a type, that is,
people independently wealthy and without business cares or worries, that it was reason-
ably certain that they would live longer than the term of years allotted to them by
the tables]." Id. at 156.
34. See Chauncery Stillman, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 478 (1965); Estate of Irma
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The Miami court stated that even though there are some discrep-
ancies in the tables which may prove unfortunate for individual tax-
payers, these discrepancies may have to be suffered in the interest of a
simplified overall administration of the tax laws.35  This argument
cuts both ways, however, and the government should accept its share
of unfortunate tax results because of use of the tables. Nevertheless,
courts have generally allowed the "presumptive correctness" of the tables
to be rebutted only in favor of the Commissioner, as seen in Miami
and Merchants National, where the government argued inconsistently
in the two cases and won in both. Strict use of the tables at least would
place the cost of administrative convenience on both parties equally,
even though the government can more easily bear the burden.
In the earlier memorandum decision of Merchants National the
court developed an ingenious actuarial argument for the exclusive use
of the regulation tables:
If the tables were not determinative in arriving at the value
of a life estate, and the IRS were allowed to prove the probability
of death at a date prior to that used in the actuarial tables, then,
of course, the tables would need to be revised to take these people
out of the sample, because the life expectancy of people in
good health would rise when not considered along with the people
in bad health. If it were accepted, as defendant [IRS] suggests,
that the presumptive correctness of the actuarial tables are over-
come where extrinsic evidence shows ill health and a probability
of early death, then the presumptive correctness would be over-
come in all cases where this could not be shown also, because
the tables include consideration of sickly people.8 6
The only rebuttal to such an argument is that the persons who come
within the purview of Revenue Ruling 66-307 are so few that they have
a negligible effect on the actuarial factors in the table-a position that
might be difficult to uphold.
Another argument for the conclusive and systematic application
of the actuarial tables might be termed "the maintenance of the court's
integrity." Consider the following hypothetical: X devises certain
property to a charity with an intervening life estate in favor of his son Y
who has an incurable disease. At X's death his executor argues that
the tables are unrealistic because of Ys condition (the lower the value
of Y's life interest, the greater the charitable deduction allowed), but
E. Green, 22 T.C. 728 (1954); cf. McMurty v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir.
1953).
35. 443 F.2d at 119.
36. 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 1447.
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the Commissioner argues that the tables should be conclusive of Y's
life expectancy. Y dies shortly after his father and his executor (who
may be the same as was his father's) applies for the tax credit for prior
transfers. Here the executor argues that the tables should be con-
clusive of Y's life expectancy at the time of the prior transfer (the
greater the value of the life interest, the more credit allowed). The
Commissioner now argues, however, that actual expectancy should
be used to value the interest, because use of the tables would cause
unreasonable results. Some courts have stressed that the tables affect
an averaging of results and that the Commissioner "may not switch
back and forth for the sake of revenue."' 7 Strict utilization of the
regulation tables would prevent such insults to the courts' integrity.
Most of the arguments against exclusive use of actuarial tables
arose when the old actuarial tables were in effect.38  These tables as-
sumed an interest factor of three and one-half percent per year and
were based on mortality figures derived from the 1939-1941 census.39
Since they were based on outmoded assumptions and data, the tables
were quickly recognized as inadequate;40 it was generally felt tha they
should not be used exclusively in all cases. Several courts rejected the
tables because the assumed rate of interest was unrealistic,41 but even
these cases required an extreme discrepancy to overcome the presumption
in favor of the tables.
New tables are presently in effect for transactions occurring after
December 31, 1970 for valuation of annuities, life estates, terms for
years, remainders and reversions. 42 These tables are based on ac-
tuarial data supplied by the 1959-1961 census and assume a six per-
cent interest rate, compounded annually. Therefore, many of the argu-
ments against exclusive use of actuarial tables that pertained to the
antiquated 1952 tables are no longer cogent. In addition to increased
life expectancy figures and interest rates, the new tables provide separate
male and female listings, recognizing the actuarial fact that women
normally outlive men. Commentators contend that the revised Regu-
37. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968).
38. The old tables cover transactions effected between 1952 and December 30,
1970.
39. Lyon, The Effect on Estate Planning of the New Valuation Tables for Life
Estates, Etc. N.Y.U. 30rn INST. ON FED. TAX 669, 670 (1972).
40. Id. at 671.
41. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949); Security-First Nat'l Bank, 35
B.T.A. 815 (1937).
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1958).
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lations should bring about acceptance of actuarial tables by both the
courts and the taxpayers.43
The courts and the Service have already agreed to apply con-
clusively the actuarial tables to code sections 2037 (a) (2), regard-
ing transfers taking effect at death, and 2042(2), regarding the possi-
bility of a reversion interest in life insurance proceeds. Revenue Rul-
ing 66-307, which promulgates nonconclusive use of the tables for
section 2013, specifically excepts sections 2037 and 2042 from its
purview:
However, it [principle of valuation allowing evidence out-
side the tables] may not be applied in computing the value of a
decedent's reversionary interest for the purpose of sections 2037(b)
and 2042(2) of the code. In these sections Congress has pro-
vided a rule of administrative convenience which requires the
application of actuarial tables notwithstanding the facts of the de-
cedent's death or the facts surrounding his death.44
The theory supporting strict use of the actuarial tables in these
sections was discussed by the Tax Court in Estate of Dwight B. Roy,
Jr.4 5 The court pointed to the five percent "trigger" factor40 in sections
2037 and 2042 as evidence of a legislative mandate that the calcula-
tion of value for these sections be mechanical and that the use of the
tables be exclusive.47 This theory is apparently based on the court's
belief that the five percent factor was an arbitrary figure chosen by
the legislature. However, the court may have been concerned with
more than legislative intent when this decision was reached. If strict
use of the tables were not applied to these sections, both the taxpayer
and the Commissioner would plague the court with evidence seeking
to vary the life expectancy from that reported in the table, either to
trigger or to avoid triggering the five percent factor. And in these
sections a few years difference in life expectancy could be crucial, for,
once the five percent level is reached, there is a full inclusion-not just
a five percent inclusion.
43. Lyon, supra note 39, at 692. Of course, if the courts adopt strict use of the
tables in all tax situations, it would be imperative that the tables be periodically updated
to recognize realistic figures for both life expectancy and interest rate. The gain realized
from administrative convenience alone should justify the cost of keeping the tables in
line with current values.
44. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 430.
45. 54 T.C. 1317 (1970).
46. These sections are "triggered," Le. cause an inclusion in the gross estate, when-
ever a decedent's interest value reaches 5% of the total value of the property in question.
There is then a full inclusion of the property and not just a 5% inclusion.
47. 54 T.C. at 1323.
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Finally, the Merchants National decision has an impact upon es-
tate tax planning. When the planner cannot rely exclusively on the
actuarial tables, his client's ultimate tax liability is unnecessarily specu-
lative .4  An example of the planning ramifications of the method
used for valuation can be seen in the establishment of a private an-
nuity agreement. Whether the actuarial tables will be strictly used
is very important for the estate planning of the transferor. The es-
tate and gift tax advantages of the annuity agreement may be preserved
only if the present value of the annuity promise equals the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the time of the transfer.49 Only by relying
on the tables can the planner ascertain such present value with cer-
tainty. If property worth 100,000 dollars is transferred in exchange
for an annuity promise worth 50,000 dollars, a potentially taxable gift
of 50,000 dollars has been made. Consequently, it is important for
the planner to know how the 'Commissioner will determine present
value. Likewise, a planner cannot satisfactorily advise a client con-
cerning disposition to a disabled relative if he cannot rely on the con-
clusiveness of the Regulation tables.
Hopefully, the courts will transpose the presumptive correctness
of the Treasury's actuarial tables into a conclusive presumption of
law. In light of the administrative convenience that would be fos-
tered, the reliability of the new tables and the boon to estate planning
that would result, the courts have ample reasons to do so.
HUGH F. OATES, JR.
Uniform Commercial Code-§ 2-702: Conflict with § 67c(1)(A)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act
In the recent case of In re Federal's, Inc.1 the question of
whether section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code creates
a statutory lien that is invalid against the trustee in bankruptcy was be-
fore the court. Section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code per-
48. Estate tax liability is always indefinite at the planning stage. But, if the tables
may be relied upon conclusively, the planner at least has an idea of the outer limits of
tax liability.
49. Lyon, supra note 39, at 677.
1. 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
1974] 169
